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tation by Betts that Miss Wilson had her first contact and
conversation with petitioner.
But the evidence shows that when Miss Wilson and a friend
called on petitioner in response to the Betts letter, they
"merely told him after listening we would let him know later,
and when we got outside we both agreed we did not think
he had to offer what the other group in San Jose had to offer,
and that ended the matter." Notwithstanding this, petitioner
claims he believed that as a result of the interview Miss Wilson had retained him. When asked: "Referring to the two
depositors. White and Wilson, weren't you interested in determining in some more exact fashion than just the statement
from Mr. Betts what clients you represented in this matter?",
petitioner replied, "Well, I thought it was a bit odd there
weren't contracts from them but I assumed in the confusion
and handling of these various papers' he had misplaced them
01' lost them, and there would be no reason for me to have the
names on the list unless he had at one time contracts from
them." Although petitioner never saw Betts after 1939, he
continued until the spring of 1942, to assert his claims for
fees against Miss Wilson and the other alleged clients.
The record shows ample support for the findings and conclusions of the board, and no good reason has been advanced
for refusing to follow its recommendation.
It is ordered that petitioner be and he is hereby suspended
from the practice of the law for six months, this order to
become effective thirty days from the filing of this decision.
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[So F. No. 16889. In Bank. Oct. 24, 1944.]

WELLS FARGO & OOMP ANY (a Corporation); Appellant,
v. OITY AND OOUNTY OF SAN FRANCISOO, Respondent.
[So F. No. 16890. In Bank. Oct. 24, 1944.]

WELLS FARGO & OOMPANY (a Oorporation), Appellant,
v. CITY AND OOUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent.
[1] Judgments-Collateral Attack-Motions to Va.cate Judgments.

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

-A motion to vacate a judgment, made after the expiration
of the six-month period allowed in Code Civ. Proc., § 473, is
governed by the rules applicable to coUateral attack. .
ld.-Collateral Attack-Limiting Consideration to Matter Apparent on Record.-ln the absence of extrinsic fraud or mistake, a judgment which is collaterally attacked cannot be set
aside unless it is void on its face.
ld.-Collateral Attack-Presumptions.-Every presumption is
in favor of the validity of a judgment, and any condition of
facts consistent with its validity will be presumed to have
existed, rather than one which will defeat it.
ld.-Collateral Attack-Erroneous Judgment.-A mere erroneous decision on a question of law, even though the error
appears on the face of the record, does not make the judgment
void, if the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of
the person of the defendant.
Dismissal-Delay in Bringing Action to Trial-Delay Exceeding Five Years.-Since a statute cannot cut off a right of action without allowing a reasonable time after its effective date
for the exercise of the right, Code Civ. Proc., § 583, which be- .
came effective in its present form in 1933, and which makes the
filing of the action the starting point of the five-year period,

[4] See 15 Cal.Jur. 83; 31 Am.Jur. 181.
[5] Construction and application of statutory requirement that
action should be brought to trial within specified time, note, 112
A.L.R. 1158.. See, also, 9 Cal.Jur. 542.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Judgments, § 282(3); [2] Judgments,
§ 290; [3] Judgments, § 296; [4] Judgments, § 330; [5] Dismissal,
§ 64; [6] Judgments, § 335; [7] Attorneys, § 55; [8] Attorneys,
§ 62; [9] Attorneys, § 46; [10, 12] Taxation, § 290; [11] Judgments, § 330(2); [13] Judgments, § 331; [14] Costs, § 2.

Jct.1944J

38

WELLS FARGO & CO.

V.

CITY

!·;TC. OF

S. F.

[25 C.2d

WELLS F A1WO & Co.

t) •.cl'fV

P;TC. OF

[25 C.2d 37; 152 P.2d 625]

S. F.

::J9

-------------------

§ 3819, is not limited to the recovery of the amount of tax paid,

cannot constitutionally apply to plaintiff's actions commenced
in 1907 and 1908, at which time the statute allowed plaintiff
five years from the filing of the answer in which to bring an
action to tri a L
[6] Judgments--Collateral Attack-Default JUdgments.-Even if
Code Civ. Proc., § 583, requiring dismissal of an action not
brought to trial within five years, were susceptible of the construction that a reasonable time after amendment of the
statute had expired when plaintiff, about four and a half
years later, applied for entry of default judgments, the trial
court by entering the judgments determined that plaintiff's
actions were brought to trial within a reasonable time, and
such determination is not sub,iect to collateral attack.
[7] Attorneys-Authority-Conduct of Litigation-Exclusiveness
of Control-An attorney of recol'd has the exclusive right to
appear in court for his client and to control the court proceedings, so that neither the party himself nor another attorney
can be recognized by the court in the conduct or disposition
of the case.
[8] Id.-Authority-Scope-Employment of Associate Counsel.If any attorney of record associates another attorney with him,
it rests with them to divide the duties concerning the conduct
of the cause.
[9] ld.-Substitution of Attorneys-Necessity.-The requirements
of a substitution as prescrIbed in Code Civ. Proc., §§ 284, 285,
-are not applicable to an associated attorney unless he attempts
to act as the sole attorney and to convert his association into
a substitution for the attorney of record.
[10] Taxation-Recovery of Taxes Paid-Judgment-Interest.In an action to recover taxes paid under protest under Pol.
Code, § 3819, interest cannot be allowed from the time of
payment, but only from the time of the adjUdication declaring
the money due.
(lla, llb] Judgments-Collateral Atta,ck-Judgment-Extent of
Recovery-Interest.-A judgment erroneously awarding an
aggrieved taxpayer interest from the time of payment of the
taxes until the date of judgment, and not from the time of the
adjudication declaring the money due, is not open to collateral
attack on the ground that the scope of the relief granted
exceeds the relief to which the taxpayer is entitled under the
law applicable to his cause of action.
[12] Taxation-Recovery of Taxes l'aid-Judgment--Interest.The permission to sue a county, as granted by Pol. Code,

[7] See 3 Cal.Jur. 637, 652; 5 Am.Jur. 311.
[8] See 5 Am.Jur. 302.
[10] See 24 Ca1.Jur. 318; 51 Am. JUl'. 1008.

but extends to so much interest as is owed the taxpayer under
general rules of law.
[13a, 13b] Judgments - Collateral Attack - Costs.-A judgment
awarding costs against a city and county is not subject to collateral attack, but is conclusive after the judgment becomes
final, where the court had jurisdiction of the person and subject matter.
.
[14] Costs-Nature of Right.-The awarding of costs is but an
incident to the judgment.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of the City
and County of San Francisco setting aside default judgments.
George J. Steiger, Judge. Reversed.
.
pillsbury, Madison & Sutro for Appellant.
John J. O'Toole, City Attorney, and Norman Sanford
Wolff, Deputy City Attorney, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.--On April 24, 1907, and July 15, 1908,
plaintiff brought actions under section 3819 of the political
Code to recover from defendant $899 and $1,860 for taxes
paid under protest, together with interest from the date of
payment and costs. In each case a general demurrer was overruled and time was allowed to answer. Notices of the orders
overruling the demurrers were served, but no answers were
filed and there were no further proceedings until January
25, 1938, about thirty years after the filing of the complaints,
when an attorney, who was not plaintiff's attorney of record,
secured default judgments for $2,822.59 and $5,700.90, including interest from the time when the taxes were paid until
the date of the judgments, and costs. On defendant's motion
in November 1938, when the time for an appeal or for a motion under section 47B of the Code of Civil Procedure had
expired, the judgments were set aside as void and the actions
dismissed for want of prosecution. Defendant bases its attack
on the judgments on the grounds that after expiration of the'
five-year period allowed in section 583 of the Code of Civil
Procedure for bringing an action to trial the court lost jurisdiction except to dismiss the actions, that the court had no
jurisdiction to enter the judgments upon the application of
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an attorney who was not plaintiff's attorney of record, and
that both the awarding of costs against a subdivision of the
state and the granting of interest for a period preceding the
judgment were in excess of the jurisdiction of the court.
[1] A motion to vacate a judgment, made after the expiration of the six-month period allowed in section 473 of the
Code of Civil Procedure :~or a motion to set aside a default
judgment, is governed by the rules applicable to collateral attack. (Borenstein v. Borenstein, 20 Cal.2d 379, 381 [125 P.2d
465J; City of Salinas v. Luke /[ow Lee, 217 Cal. 252 [18
P.2d 335] ; In re Morehouse, 176 Cal. 634, 636 [169 P. 365] ;
Lake v. Bonynge, 161 Cal. 120, 126 [118 P. 535] ; People v.
Norris, 144 Cal. 422 [77 P. 998J ; Canadian etc. Co. v. Clarita
etc. Co., 140 Cal. 672, 674 [74 P. 301J ; see 15 Cal.Jur. 47,
§ 139.) [2] In the absence of extrinsic fraud or mistake
(see Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570, 575 [122 P.2d 564, 140
A.L.R. 1328 J) a judgment so attacked cannot be set aside
unless it is void on its face. (Hahn v. /[elly, 34 Cal. 391 (94
Am. Dec. 742] ; City of Salinas v. Luke /[ow Lee, supra; Burrows v. Burrows, 10 Cal.App.2d 749 [52 P.2d 606J ; Texas Co.
v. Bank of America, 5 Cal.2d 35 [53 P.2d 127J ; Estate of
Keet, 15 Cal.2d 328 [100 P.2d 1045J ; Kaufmann v. California
Mining etc. Syndicate, 15 Cal.2d 90 [104 P.2d 1038J ; Salter
v. Ulrich, 22 Cal.2d 263 [138 P.2d 7, 146 A.L.R. 1344].)
[3] "Every presumption is in favor of the validity of the
judgment, and any condition of facts consistent with its
validity [and not affirmatively contradicted by the judgment
roll1 will be presumed to have existed rather than one which
will defeat it" (Borenstein v. Borenstein, supra, at p. 381;
Kaufmann v. California Mining etc. Syndicate, supra, at p.
92; City of Salinas v. Luke Kow Lee, supra, at p. 256; Hahn
v. Kelly, supra, at p. 430). [4] A mere erroneous decision
on a question of law, even though the error appears on the
face of the record, does not make the judgment void, if the
court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person
of the defendant. (Panos v.Great Western Packing Co., 21
Cal.2d 636, 640 [134 P.2d 242] ; Estate of Keet, supra, at p.
333; Gray v. Hall, 203 Cal. 306 [265 P. 246] ; Associated Oil
Co. v. Mullin, 110 Cal.App. 385 [294 P. 421] ; Creditors Adjustment Co. v. Newman, 185 Cal. 509, 513 [197 P. 334] ; 15
Cal.Jur. 83; 1 Freeman on JUdgments [1925J, § 322, p. 642,
§ 357, p. 742).
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Defendant's contention that the judgments are void on the
ground that the court had lost jurisdiction except to dismiss
them, is based on section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which in its pertinent part provides: "Any action heretofore
or hereafter commenced shall be dismissed by the court in
which the same shall have been commenced or to which it
may be transferred on motion of the defendant, after due
notice to plaintiff or by the court upon its own motion, unless
such action is brought to trial within five years after the plaintiff has filed his action, except where the parties have stipu.
latEld in writing that the time may be extended." Only if the
judgment was entered in violation of this section would the
jurisdictional question arise.
Section 583, which became effective in its present form on
August 21, 1933, makes the filing of the action the starting
point of the five-year perIOd. It had previously allowed the
plaintiff five years from the filing of the answer in which to
bring the action to trial. (Overaa v. Keeney, 169 Cal. 628 [147
P. 466] ; Barton v. City of Richmond, 39 Cal.App 564 r179
P. 522]; Romero v. Snyder, 167 Cal. 216 f138 P. 1002].) Since
the actions in the present case were commenced in 1907 and
1908, they were originally governed by the old statute. and
the five years allowed for the prm;ecution of the action did
not start to run, for no answers were ever filed. Under the
new statute, whichanpJies to "any action heretofore
commenced," plaintiff's right of action was cut off immediately upon enactment of the amendment for the whole of the
five-year period, computed from the filing of the action, had
alreadv run when the amenoment to section 583 became effective. [5) Since a <;tatute cannot cut off a right of action
without allowing a reasonable time after its effective date for
the exercise of the right ((:oleman v. Superior Court, 135 Cal.
App. 74, 76 r26 P.2d 6731: Rosenrld Packing Co. v. Superior
C01lrt. 4 Cal.2d 120 r47 P.2d 716] :' Superior Oil Co. v. Superwr C01J,rt. 6 Ca1.2d 113 [56 P.2d 950: Masonic Mines Association v. Superior Oourt, 136 Cal.App. 298 [28 P.2d 691];
Miami Valle1! etc. Co. v Pacific National Bank. 13 Cal.App.2d
621 [57 P.2d 233] : Mnrphy v. Murphy. 5 Cal.2d 640 r55 P.2d
1169]: 9 CaJ..Jur. !142: 112 A.L.R. 1158, 1164)' the new
<;tl1tute cannot constitntionallyapply to plaintiff's actions.
[6] Defendant contends that even though the period pre-

--------
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scribed had clearly run when thf' amendment became effective,
it should be construed as providing a reasonable time after
the enactment of the amendment and that a reasonable time
thereafter had expired when plaintiff. about four and a half
years later, applied for entry of the judgments. Even if the
statute were susceptible of such a construction (see Coleman
v. Superior Court, SUpra; Masonic JUnes Assn., v. Superior
Court, Supra .. Stevens v. Sacramento Suburban Fruit Lands
Co., 109 Cal. App. 120. 144 r292 p. 699J; 17 R.C.L. 677; 34
Am .•Jur. Limitation of Actions, ~ 22), the trial court by entering the judgments determined that plaintiff's actions :vere
brought 'to trial within a reasonable time. Since the court had
jurisdiction to make that determination, it is not subject to
collateral attack.

disposition of the case. (Board of Commissioners v. Younger,
supraj Crescent Canal Co. v. Montgomery, supra.) [8] If the
attorney of record, however, associates another attorney with'
him, it rests with them to divide the duties concerning the ,
conduct of the cause. (See 5 Am.Jur., Attorneys at Law, § 73, ,
p. 302; 7. C.J.S., § 107, p. 938; 6 C.J., § 181, p. 668.) [9] The
requirements of a substitution as prescribed in sections 284,
and 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable'
unless the associated attorney
. attempts to act as the sole at.'\
torney rather than as an associated attorney and to convert.
his association into a substitution for the attorney of record:~'
(Prescott v. Salthouse. supra. McMahon·v. Thomas, ·supra.)
In the present case Sweeney did not claim to act as sole at-;
torney for plaintiff. but applied for the judgments 8.A "one
of the attorneys for plaintiff" referring to' his association
with the attorneys of record from whom he derived his authority, and thus did not depart from the proper course for
an associated attorney.
'
The judgments awarded interest to the plaintiff from the
time of payment of the taxes until the date of the judgments.
[10] It is well settled that in an action to recover taxes paid
nnder protest under section 3819 of the Political Code, interest
cannot he allowed from the time of payment bi.lt only. from
the time of the adjudication declaring tbemoney due.! (Sav·
ings &- DorIn 80ciety v. San F'mncisco, 131 Cal. 356 r63 P.
665]: Columbia 8avinqs Rank v. Los A.ngeles.137 Cal. 467
r70 P. 3081; Miller v. [(ern Oounty. 150 Cal. 797 rnO P. 119];
Spencer v. [;08 A.nqeles, 180 Cal. 103. 115 f179 P. 1631 :T7nited
Taxpayers Co. v,. San Pra.ncisco. 55 Cal.App. 239. 24B r203'
p, 1201; 24 Ca1.Jur. 318.) [lb] It does not follow. how:
ever, that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in allowing thE"
interest in question c Such a judgment is not open to collateral
attack on the ground that the scope of the relief granted by
the court exceeds the relief to which plaintiff is entitled under
the law applicable to his cause of action. (Redlands etc. School
District v. Superior Conrt. 20 Ca1.2d ~48. 360 f125 P.2d 490] ;
Estrin v. S1tperior Court. 14 Ca1.2d 670, 675 [96 P.2d 3401;
Lankton v. Superior C01trt. 5 CaI.2d 694 [55 P.2d 11701;
~.

Defendant contends that the court had no POwer to enter
the .judgments upon application of James P. Sweeney, an attorney, Who, though not appearing of record as plaintiff's attorney, was associated by plaintiff's attorneys of record in
these matters upon authorization of their client: Defendant
claims that while plaintiff had attorneys of record, Sweeney
could not enter a valid appearance for plaintiff without previously filing the written consent of the client and the attorneys of record with th(' clerk and giving written notice to
the adverse party, as prescrihed in sp('tions 2R4 and 285 of
thp Code of CiVil Procedurf'.
[7] It is Settled that the attorney of record has the ex,elusive right to appear in court for his client and to control
,the court proceedings, so that nf'ither the party himself (An.qlo
f!alifornia Tnt,st Co. v. Kelly, 95 Cal.App. 390 [272 P. 1080] ;
Roca etc. R. R. Co. v. Superior Court. HiO Cal.1!'i3f88 P. 715] ;
Electric Utilitie.~ Co. v. Smallpa.qe. 1~7 Cal. App. 642, 043 r3J
P.2d 412J ; Toy v. Haskell, 128 Ca/. 558 f6J p, 89. 79 Am. St.
Rep. 70]; Crescent Canal Co. v. Montgomery. 124 Cal. 134
f56 P. 797J; WlIlie v. Sierra Gold no .. 120 CAl. 4R5 f52 p.
809J; Mott v. Poster, 45 Cal. 72; Roard of Commissioners v.
Younger. 29 Cal. 147 [87 Am. Dec. J 641), nor another attorney
(.lor"nston v. City of San Pernando. 3fi Cal. App.2d 244. 247
r95 P.2d 147J ; Drummond v. West. 212 Cal. 766. 769 faoo P.
823] ; McMahon v. Thomas, 114 Cal. ?iRS [46 P. 732J ; Prescott
v. 8althouse, 53 Cal. 221: Hobbs 1'. nl1,ff. 4~ (;111. 4Rfi: ~ n!'ll.
Jur. 637), can be recognized by the court in the conduct or

iRev'; & Tax. Code. § 5141. enacted' in, 1941, provides ,for in.;;
terest from date of payment under protest, as 'to taxes paid after
the effective date of the section.
'i'

.~

~,!<'.~'
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[12J Section 3819 of the Political Code, under which the
present actions were brought, provides that a property owner
who claims that a tax paid by him under protest is illegal
"may at any time within six months after such payment
bring an action against the county, in the superior Court. to
recover back the tax so paid under protest." The permission to sue a county (Cal. Const .. art. XX, § 6; Union Bank
& Trust Co. of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County, 2 Cal.
App.2d 600 [38 P.2d 442J ; Liebman v. Richmond, 103' Cal.
App. 354 [284 P. 731J ; Colusa County v. Glenn County, 117
Cal. 434 [49 P 4571; 7 CaLJur. 557) granted by this statute
is not limited to the recovery of the amount of tax paid. but
extends to so much interest as is owed the taxpayer under the
genera] rules of law. fCol1l'mbia 8avin.qs Bank v. Los Angeles,
supra: Spencer v. City of Los An.qeles, supra.) [l1bJ In allowing interest from the earlier date. the court erred therefore merely as to the '!cope of plaint.iff's recovery and its
judgment is therefore not sub.iect to collateral attack. (Panos
v.
Great
242J.
) Western Packing Go;, 21 Ca1.2d 636, 640 [134 P.2d
[13aJ Finally, defendant attacks that part of the judg.
ments awarding costs. claiming that as a city and county it
cannot be required to pay costs. Even if the court was without authority to award costR to plaintiff, it would not fonow
that the judgments are Ruhject to collateral attack. The court
had jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter.
[14] The awarding of costs is but an incident to the judg.
ment (Begbie v. Begbie, 128 Cal. 154. 155 r60 P. 6671 : Gutting
v. Globe Indemnity 00 .. l]!) CalApp. 288 [6 P.2d 298J ; Ablett
v. Hancock Oi7 Co .. 10 Cal.App.2C1 58. 59 r50 P.2d 1077J;
Purdy v. Johnson. 100 Cal.App 416 [280 P. 1811: Ritter v.
Ritter'. 381 Ill. 549 r46 N.E.2d 41J ; see 39 A.L.R. 1218), and
is therefore within the court's jurisdiction to enter the judg.
ment. [13b] Hence the award of costs is conclusive after
the judgment becomes final. (PanfJS v. Great TV estern Packing OfJ., 21 Cal.2d 636, 640 [134 P.2d 242J.)
The orders are reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Carter,
J., and Schauer, J., concurred.

~~-----~,-"",'
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ALFRED D. MITCHELL et aI., Appellants, v. CEAZAN
TIRES, LTD., Respondent.
[1] Landlord and Tenant-Termination-Frustration of Purpose.
-A lessee who was authorized to use the premises for' an au:"
tomobile tire business and other' related businesses, such as
automobile supplies, was not excused from further performance under the lease by governmental regulations restricti:r'\g
the free sale of new automobile tires, .where the lease·.was
executed in 1940. when the entry of this country into the war
was the subject of much debate. 80 that such an event was
. not so remote as to be unforeseeable, and where, regardless
of such anticipation, the leaRe retaineil value for the lessee.
[2] Id. - Termination - Fmstration of Purpose.-The excuse of
frustration, like that of impossibility, is a conclusion of law'
drawn by the court from the fads of a given case; and in an
action for declaration of rights nnder a lease for an. automo·
bile tire business and other relAted businesses, although the
court found that the lessee's business was "frustrated" itnd
rendered "unlawful" and "impossible" by governmental regUlations restricting the free sale of new automobile tires, the
evidence did not establish that the sa.le of new tires was made
illegal or impossihle. or that the. purpose of the lease was
frustrated Nor was the lessee Ilided by a finding that the
related lawful condnct of the businesses was an implied condi·
tion of the lease rendered impossible by said regulations,.
where there was nothing to show that such businesses were
made illegaL

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
.
Angeles County. John Gee Clark, Judge. Reversed.
Action by lessor against lessee for declaratory relief. Judg.
ment for defendant reversed.
[1) Lease of property for specified exclusive uses as affected .by
a partial restriction npon such uses by statute, ordinance or ruling
adopted or made during the term, note, 7 A.L.R. 836. See, also,
150al.Jur. 770; 32 Am.Jur. 700.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1,2] Landlord and Tenant, § 197.

